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Today, when one thinks of the United States Supreme Court's seminal
decisions concerning the constitutional regulation of confessions, attention
naturally turns to Miranda v. Arizona.' In Miranda, the Court famously
required that police provide warnings to suspects prior to conducting
custodial interrogations, triggering a firestorm of criticism2 and an
ever-expanding scholarly literature over the years.3 Miranda, decided by a
5-4 vote, has since "become part of our national culture,"' as evidenced by
the spate of law review symposia commemorating its recent fifty-year
anniversary.'
* Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. For much
appreciated feedback, I thank David Ball, Carissa Hessick, Kay Levine, Paul Marcus, Eric Miller, George
Thomas, Ron Wright, and attendees of the Texas Tech Law Review 2017 Entering the Second Fiiiy Years
of Miranda Criminal Law Symposium and the Association of American Law Schools Criminal Justice
Section Mid-Year Meeting. For excellent research assistance, thanks to James Falls, Molly Gray, Victoria
Suarez, and, most especially, Jacqueline Van Laningham. Finally, I thank Professor Arnold Loewy and
members of the Texas Tech Law Review for inviting me to, and hosting, the 2017 Criminal Law
Symposium.
1. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Arthur Krock, Court's Ruling Restricts Police, ATLANTA J. CONST., June 16, 1966, at
4; Supreme Court Ruling Called Unrealistic by District Attorney, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1966, at OCI;
Fred P. Graham, High Court Puts New Curb on Power of the Police to Interrogate Suspects, N.Y. TIMES
(June 14, 1966), http://www.nytimes.comleaming/general/onthisday/big/0613.html#article.
3. See, e.g., WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). A Westlaw query in
the "Journals and Law Reviews" database, for instance, generates over 9,500 entries. Id
4. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
5. In addition to this Symposium, Entering the Second Fifty Years of Miranda, see, for example,
Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona, 97 B.U. L. REv. 681 (2017); Symposium,
Mirandaat 50,43 N. KY. L. REv. 301 (2016); Symposium, Policing in America on the Fiftieth Anniversary
ofMiranda v. Arizona, 10 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 3 (2016). For individual commemorative articles, see,
for example, Brooks Holland, Miranda v. Arizona: 50 Years of Judges Regulating Police Interrogation,
15 INSIGHTS ON L. & Soc'y 2 (2015); Eugene R. Milhizer, Miranda's Near Death Experience: Reflections
on the Occasion ofMirandas Fiftieth Anniversary, 66 CATH. U. L. REv. 577 (2017; Damesha Carter &
Ellen S. Podgor, Miranda at 50, CHAMPION, May 2016, at 16; David N. Wecht, Miranda at 50, PA. LAW.,
Nov.-Dec. 2016, at 26.
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The purpose of this Article is to consider yet another Warren Court
decision regarding confessions, one issued two years before Miranda:
Massiah v. United States.6 In Massiah, the Court deviated from its
decades-long reliance on due process to limit police authority to extract
confessions,' focusing instead on the right to counsel contained in the Sixth
Amendment.' According to the Court, police use of a co-defendant to
surreptitiously obtain an incriminating statement from Massiah after he had
been indicted in the absence of counsel violated the Sixth Amendment's
"basic protections."'
Massiah was "a giant step in a wholly new direction"10 and inspired a
spirited three-member dissent, written by Justice Byron White, voicing a tone
of alarm" akin to that in the Miranda dissents coming two years later.12
Testament to its perceived importance, a quarter century after Massiah was
decided, the Reagan Administration's Office of Legal Policy published a
series highlighting criminal procedure decisions qualifying as "obstructions
ofjustice," dedicating an entire report to Massiah."
6. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
7. See Catherine Hancock, Due Process before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2195,2198-2201 (1996).
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
9. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. According to the majority, the government's use of Massiah's
co-defendant o surreptitiously record the challenged statement resulted in Massiah's Sixth Amendment
right being "more seriously imposed upon ... because he did not even know that he was under
interrogation by a government agent." Id. (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (2d Cir.
1962) (Hays, J., dissenting), rev'd, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)).
10. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of a Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the
Current Rules ofAccess and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1155 (1987).
11. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, discussing the outcome,
stated that it is,
a rather portentous occasion when a constitutional rule is established barring the use of
evidence which is relevant, reliable and highly probative of the issue which the trial court has
before it-whether the accused committed the act with which he is charged .... The
importance of the matter should not be underestimated, for today's rule promises to have wide
application well beyond the facts of this case .... [This decision is] nothing more than a
thinly disguised constitutional policy of minimizing or entirely prohibiting the use in evidence
of voluntary out-of-court admissions and confessions made by the accused . .. [and it will]
have a severe and unfortunate impact upon the great bulk of criminal cases.
Id.
12. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 364 U.S. 436, 517, 541-42 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the majority was "taking a real risk with society's welfare"). Justice Harlan declared that
the majority's decision would "measurably weaken the ability of the criminal law to perform [its most
basic] tasks .... In some unknown number of cases the Court's rule will return a killer, a rapist or other
criminal to the streets and to the environment which produced him, to repeat his crime whenever it pleases
him." Id.
13. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POL'Y, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES,
REPORT No. 3, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
UNDER THE MASSIAH LINE OF CASES, reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 661, 696, 706 (1989) (stating that
Massiah is "detrimental to effective law enforcement, as well as subversive of the truth-finding process").
Like Miranda, Massiah was the subject of purported congressional repeal in 1968. WAYNE R. LAFAVE
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Yet, unlike Miranda, Massiah's fifty-year anniversary (in 2014) passed
unnoticed by legal commentators. Perhaps this should come as no surprise
given the sustained attention Miranda has received from the Court,14
compared to the Court's relatively slim oeuvre of Massiah-related
decisions." Indeed, a reading of the United States Reports can support an
inference that the Court is rather satisfied with Massiah.16 For instance, in
the late 1970s, a time when the Court repeatedly undercut Miranda
protections, the Court decided Brewer v. Williams" (also known as the
"Christian burial speech" case), invoking Massiah to bar admission of a
statement secured by police from an individual suspected of abducting a
ten-year-old girl. Reflecting on Massiah, Professor James Tomkovicz opined
in 2012 that "[fjor nearly fifty years, the Massiah doctrine has saved the Sixth
Amendment right to trial counsel from efforts to circumvent and dilute the
shelter it affords,"" embodying "ournation's commitment to fair play."19
This Article assesses whether Massiah warrants such praise and
concern. It does so by reporting the results of a study of state and federal
court cases deciding Massiah-related claims between the Massiah decision
and when the Court decided Montejo v. Louisiana,20 which imposed major
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.4(i) (4th ed. 2015-2017) (citing and discussing the Crime Control Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
14. See Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2016) (noting multiple
Miranda-related ecisions and the complexity of resulting caselaw).
15. See YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY
160 (1980) (observing that Massiah was "apparently lost in the shuffle of fast-moving events that reshaped
constitutional-criminal procedure in the 1960s"); see also James J. Tomkovicz, Sacricing Massiah:
Confusion Over Exclusion and Erosion of the Right to Counsel, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, 9 n.27
(2012) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah] ("Although the Miranda opinion cast no doubt on
the Massiah doctrine and there was no logical tension between the two exclusionary dictates, during the
years following Miranda, the Supreme Court virtually ignored Massiah.").
16. See James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel against
Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1988) [hereinafter
Tomkovicz, Adversary System]. Describing Massiah, Professor Tomkovicz noted:
Massiah is certainly a rare anomaly in these conservative times. Against a backdrop of erosion
and decline for criminally accused individuals' constitutional rights . . . the Massiah right has
survived . . . . The Massiah entitlement has been the one constitutional right that has
consistently furnished criminal defendants with support for victorious claims.
Id. at 6 (noting also "Massiah's phenomenal endurance").
17. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
18. Tomkovicz, Sacricing Massiah, supra note 15, at 67; see also James J. Tomkovicz, The
Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REV. 751,
752 (1989) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion] ("The Massiah doctrine's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel against open or surreptitious elicitation of incriminating information by state
agents has proven remarkably durable for a quarter of a century.").
19. Tomkovicz, Sacrficing Massiah, supra note 15, at 66; see also Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205 (1964) (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)) (stating that the
purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to protect "the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal
causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with crime[s]").
20. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
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limits on Massiah's application.21 The study utilized a research method
known as judicial opinion "content analysis,"22 which is thought to be
especially well-suited to critical evaluation of the actual impact of judicial
doctrine.2 3 In addition to being the first large-scale empirical investigation
of Massiah's impact, the study is important for its augmentation of research
concerning the impact of due process and Miranda-based limits, allowing for
a fuller understanding of the Court's constitutional regulation of confessions.
Part I describes the data collection and analysis effort, which entailed
the review and coding of over 1,800 cases contained in the Westlaw
"allcases" database decided during the above-described time period.24 If
Montejo marks an end to what seemed a major limit on police authority,
analysis of the data reported on in this Article, discussed in Part II, illuminate
what has been lost.25 As it turns out, despite Massiah's initial promise, it has
had only limited impact, at least when viewed in terms of the caselaw.26 Part
III contextualizes these results by examining research conducted to date on
the impact of other confession-related constitutional limits imposed on police
by the Court, especially those concerning Massiah's contemporary-
Miranda.27
I. METHODS
The empirical method employed was straightforward: utilizing
Westlaw, gather the cases decided from the date the Court issued Massiah on
May 18, 1964 through May 26, 2009 (when the Court issued Montejo v.
21. See, e.g., Craig Bradley, What's Left of Massiah?, 45 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 247, 247, 264 (2012)
(stating that Massiah "has largely been stripped of meaning by Montejo" and concluding that Montejo
"tore down an elaborate edifice of law as to the right of counsel of defendants for whom formal
proceedings had begun, which ad grown up following the 1964 decision in Massiah v. United States");
Craig A. Mastantuono & Rebecca M. Coffee, SOS Defendant's Right to Counsel, 85 Wis. LAW. 6, 8
(2012) (stating that Montejo "shifted the balance of power dramatically in favor of the government");
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogation and the Roberts Court, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1189, 1227 (2011) (stating
that Montejo "swept away most of Sixth Amendment interrogation law").
22. See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96
CAL. L. REv. 63, 99-100 (2008) (describing the method as "a more systematic and objective way to
document what courts do and what they say . . . . Content analysis can verify or refute descriptions of
case law that are based on more anecdotal or subjective study"). Consistent with the approach outlined
by Professors Hall and Wright, the study entailed three distinct components: (1) selecting cases; (2) coding
cases; and (3) analyzing the cases coded. Id at 79.
23. See Hall & Wright, supra note 22, at 84 (noting that "scholars have found it especially useful to
code and count cases in studies that debunk conventional legal wisdom"). Hall and Wright assert that the
"strongest application [of content analysis], ... is when the subject of study is the behavior of judges in
writing opinions. There, content analysis combines the analytic skills of the lawyer with the power of
science that comes from articulated and replicable methods of reading and counting cases." Id. at 100.
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See id.
27. See infra Part HI.
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Louisiana), and analyze and code the cases. Using a broad search query in
the "allcases" database,2 8 1,810 cases were generated from all levels of state
and federal courts, including published and unpublished decisions.29  The
Author and several research assistants reviewed each of these cases,
conferring when doubt existed over coding interpretive questions. Care was
taken to ensure that cases were not double-counted; for instance, if a case was
appealed, only the decision of the court of last resort (including the United
States Supreme Court) was coded. Also, because of the breadth of the search
query used, a substantial number of cases did not contain an actual
Massiah-based claim; these cases were removed from the dataset.0
Ultimately, the winnowed database contained 1,185 cases. As Table 1
illustrates, a proportion of the cases (n=144, or 12%) concerned claims based
upon Massiah-based civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or state or
federal habeas corpus claims (or other avenues for post-conviction relief).3 1







contextData=(sc.Default) (last visited Oct. 15, 2017). After consulting with Westlaw reference attorneys,
and some trial and error, the query ultimately employed was: ""sixth amend!" & Massiah & da(bef
5/26/2009)." Id. Use ofa textual query avoided the difficulties associated with simply using the Westlaw
keynote system, which can reflect categorization choices by Westlaw staff. See Joshua M. Silverstein,
Using the West Key Number System as a Data Collection and Coding Device for Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Demonstrating the Method Viaa Study ofContract Interpretation, 34 J.L. & COM. 203, 230-
31(2016).
29. WESTLAW, supra note 28. By capturing and coding unpublished decisions, not only published
decisions, the study marks an improvement over other studies rightly criticized for excluding
consideration of the former. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies
that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1899
(2009).
30. For instance, a case was removed if Massiah was cited in the decision for a more general purpose,
such as the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel or when a state court resolved a claim on the basis of its
state constitutional counterpart to the Sixth Amendment. Also, early on, it was not uncommon for cases
to turn on interpretation of some aspect of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)-decided the same
term as Massiah-which limited police questioning of individuals who were the "focus" of investigative
attention. See, e.g., Wade v. Yeager, 245 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D.N.J. 1965); Duncan v. State, 176 So. 2d 840,
863 (Ala 1965); King v. State, 212 A.2d 722, 724 (Del. 1965); State v. Shannon, 405 P.2d 837, 838-39
(Or. 1965). In 1972, the Court in Kirby v. Illinois clarified that Escobedo was more properly deemed a
Miranda (not Massiah) precedent, ultimately holding that the Sixth Amendment protection did not extend
to the pre-critical stage of proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1986) (quoting
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)) (reaffirming that Escobedo was later reinterpreted as a
Miranda case).





Suffkce it to say, using judicia
necessarily the best. method for emp
the rea-iorld effeet that doctrinal
instaice, police caln refraim hom part
or do things tt they reqirle4 More
against a LIspt miht11 be dism1i1ssed
in aple barga in (perhap a more fax
t absence o poice miscnduct).
manifest in a caselail database. it
represents an important method of na
ts Table 2 relict

























As I able 3 reflects, the sum total of government VI(
bly 7% of eases in which, as a matter of substantive lav~
fly prevailed in a Ma~iah~based claim. vet the r
iatelv held in favor of the government (most commonly,
asis oF harmless error revie~ji~
I,!"
1











h~e data, it is iflter(
~usceptihIe to beh
~~re 2% of the case
the categories thci
na~y la~mg, i dktn~mi, ~nfoHnaiion, ~n auaig
~ kPhy ~. LI~~)i\, 406 .5. 6S2. 689 19
lUrnann ~ W ~n 477 5 06 475 76 ~j986)
.0 ioi~rpwong th~ re~oW or ~ih6~ 4 it ~hooht h











2017] FALSE MASSIAH 161
1. What might be termed "Massiah availability" cases (combining
cases in which a critical stage was not reached in a case in general
(28%) or regarding a specific offense in particular (13%), accounting
for a total of 41% of government victories).4 3
2. Instances in which the government obtained an incriminating
statemeht on the basis of an undercover operation (determined not to
be a government agent (22%) and no deliberate elicitation occurred
(18%), accounted for a total of 40% of government victories).4
3. Instances in which the government prevailed on the basis of waiver
(17%).45
Overall, the 85% government victory rate is impressive in its own
right.46 It becomes even more impressive when one considers that many
cases coded as defense wins would, if decided later, evaporate in light of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions that limited Massiah's protective
reach. For instance, before the Court's decision in Texas v. Cobb,47 which
narrowed the scope of the "offense-specific" requirement,48 defendants, with
some frequency, prevailed49 on the reasoning that police questioning
concerned an offense "closely related" or "inextricably intertwined" to an
offense that had reached a critical stage.so Indeed, after Cobb held that the
double jeopardy analysis set forth in Blockburger v. United States governs
the "offense-specific" analysis," one of the most notable Massiah defense
victories, Brewer v. Williams (noted at the outset), would likely be a
43. See id
44. See id. The result contradicts initial dire predictions of the negative impact on prosecutions of
the Court's decision in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,276 (1980), which granted relief to petitioner
on the basis of a generous test providing that Massiah is violated when police use an undercover informant
and create a situation "likely to induce" an incriminating response in the absence of counsel. See, e.g., Joy
D. Fulton, Note, Sixth Amendment-Massiah Revitalized, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 601, 608 (1980)
("The Henry decision may lead prosecutors to abandon the use of undercover informants, despite he
acknowledged value of undercover work in effective law enforcement.").
45. See Table 4 - Reasons for Government Win, supra note 38.
46. See Table 3 - Government v. Defendant Wins, supra note 37. Not surprisingly, criminal
defendant-petitioners as a whole typically do not fare well in appeals. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The
Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Scorecard, 13 STAN. J. CIv. RTS. & CIv. LIBERTIES 1, 14 (2017)
(finding a defense win rate ofjust over 24% in a study of 148 Fourth Amendment cases decided by the
Supreme Court between 1982 and 2015).
47. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001).
48. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1016 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnold,
106 F.3d 37,42 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 931 F. Supp. 907, 928 (D. Mass. 1996); Taylor
v. State, 726 So. 2d 841, 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). That is not to say that the government did not
also at times prevail in offense-specific cases pre-Cobb. See, e.g., United States v. McKnight, 211 F.3d
1266 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Whatley, 245 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Doherty,
126 F.3d 769, 778 (6th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1230 (Mass. 1997).
50. See Holly Larsen, Note, United States v. Covarrubias: Does the Ninth Circuit Add to the
Ambiguity of the Inextricably Intertwined Exception?, 30 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 1, 14-32 (2000)
(describing various tests used by courts during the time).
51. Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).
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government win, as the defendant was arraigned for abduction and
questioned about a sexual assault and killing.5 2
At least as important, after the Court decided Michigan v. Jackson in
1986,53 courts granted relief to defendants when law enforcement
re-approached and questioned a defendant after he was told of his right to
counsel and invoked the right.54 Montejo v. Louisiana," however, overruled
Jackson.56 Likewise, defendants defeated government arguments of
waiver, 5  a litigation position that would have been to no avail after the
Court's 1988 decision in Patterson v. Illinois." Indeed, after Montejo, even
a defendant capable of prevailing under the more demanding Cobb
offense-specific standard would likely lose, given the power Montejo
afforded police to re-approach accused individuals and secure Sixth
Amendment waivers.59
Tables 5 and 6 reflect the ebb and flow of Massiah litigation.60 Table 5
indicates that the high-water mark for government wins during the study
period was years 2007 and 2008.61
52. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390-94 (1977). According to the Cobb majority, "[tihe
Court's opinion [in Brewer v. Williams] . .. simply did not address the significance of the fact that the
suspect had been arraigned only on the abduction charge, nor did the parties in any way argue this
question." Cobb, 532 U.S. at 169. For discussion of the significant narrowing effect of Cobb on Massiah
claims, see Michael J. Howe, Note, Tomorrow's Massiah: Towards a "Prosecution Specific"
Understanding of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 134, 149-51 (2004);
Melissa Minas, Note, Blurring the Line: Impact of Offense-Specific Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel,
93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 195, 213 (2002).
53. See Michael v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232
(4th Cir. 1986); Shafer v. Bowersox, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (E.D. Mo. 2001); People v. Richardson, 528
N.E.2d 612 (Ill. 1988); People v. Crowder, 492 N.E.2d 952 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Blagojevic, 22 MAss. L. RPTR. 285 (Super. Ct. Mass. 2007); Beckum v. State, 786 So. 2d 1060 (Miss.
2001); State v. Walker, No. 03C01-9110-CR-00346, 1993 WL 44195 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 22, 1993);
Nehman v. State, 721 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Dagnall, 612 N.W.2d 680 (Wis. 2000);
State v. Homung, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). But see United States v. Thornton, 17 F. Supp.
2d 686 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (post-Jackson government win).
55. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
56. Id. at 797.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Mohabir,
624 F.2d 1140, 1153 (2d Cir. 1980).
58. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988) ("As a general matter, ... an accused who is
admonished with the warnings prescribed by .. . Miranda ... has been sufficiently apprised of the nature
of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on
this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one.").
59. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 789.
60. Wayne A. Logan, Table 5 - Government Wins by Year and Basis (2017) (unpublished table) (on
file with author); Wayne A. Logan, Table 6 - Defendant Wins by Year (2017) (unpublished table) (on file
with author).
61. See Table 5 - Government Wins by Year and Basis, supra note 60; see also Table 6 - Defendant
Wins by Year, supra note 60. Year 2009, it should be noted, reflects only roughly one-half of the year's
case outcomes because the search query excluded cases decided after May 26, 2009, when the Court
decided Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
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Table 6 focuses on defense victories.6 2 It shows that after a few years
of positive impact for defendants in the 1960s,63 defense wins decreased
62. See Table 6 - Defendant Wins by Year, supra note 60.
63. Id This is so even though Massiah itself was deemed to be non-retroactive in its application.
See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); United States ex rel. Allison v. New Jersey, 418
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Commonwealth
v. Broaddus, 317 A.2d 635 (Penn. 1974); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 233 A.2d 542 (Penn. 1967).
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sharply in the early-mid-1970s,64 spiked upwards in the late 1970s and 1980s,
and fell again thereafter (except for a brief increase in the mid-late 2000s).65
Correlating the impact of the Court's Massiah-related ecisions on
litigation outcomes is difficult to do with specificity given the delay
associated with the trial and appellate process, in addition to the judicial
refusal to apply Massiah (and its progeny) retroactively.6 6
Table 6 - Defendant Wins by Year







1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
-- Total Cases Won -4-Total Cases Brought
64. See Table 6 - Defendant Wins by Year, supra note 60. The extent of defense wins was
significantly lessened by the tendency of courts, before 1971, to interpret Massiah as only addressing
undercover law enforcement activity, a view belied by the Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams, in which
the Court suppressed a statement obtained by a uniformed officer. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387
(1977); see also Davis v. Burke, 408 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 379 F.2d 628 (7th
Cir. 1967); Mitchell v. Stephens, 353 F.2d 129 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435
(W.D. Penn. 1966); State v. McNeil, 217 A.2d 233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1965); Baker v. State, 202 So.2d 563
(Fla. 1967); State v. Moon, 183 N.W.2d 644 (Iowa 1971); Commonwealth v. Kleciak, 216 N.E.2d 417
(Mass. 1966); State v. James, 415 P.2d 350 (N.M. 1966); Anders v. State, 445 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969); State v. Cole, 408 P.2d 387 (Wash. 1965); State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, 133 N.W.2d 753
(Wis. 1965).
65. See Table 2 - Government v. Defendant Wins, supra note 36.
66. See cases cited in supra note 63 (declining to apply Massiah retroactively).
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Moreover,. it should be noted that with defense victories, the study
employed generous definitions of a "win." For instance, an outcome was
coded as a defense victory if a reviewing court believed that the record
afforded sufficient reason to conclude that the defendant had a meritorious
claim but remanded for further factual development (with no indication in
the dataset of the ultimate outcome).67 Similarly, a defense win was recorded
when a court found Massiah error but remanded for a determination of
prejudice (again, when no other decision in the database reflected the ultimate
outcome).68
At the same time, the defense win rate must be interpreted in light of the
realities of the litigation dynamic. The cases contained in the database
plausibly reflect a selection bias in that they are likely the strongest Massiah
claims. Weaker claims, one can surmise, likely resulted in pleas-which are
absent from the caselaw dataset.69 In other words, the 15% defense win rate
likely reflects a robust picture of defense success.70
The government's overall win rate (85%), moreover, perhaps
understates matters." This is because, again, the database contained only
litigated cases, cases in which a defendant pleaded guilty due to the absence
of a meritorious Massiah claim are not reflected in the statistical count (that
is, Massiah did not adversely affect the government's case).72 Although it is
impossible to specify a precise figure, because guilty pleas account for the
overwhelming percentage of case dispositions (typically in excess of 90%),"
the actual government "win" rate can be expected to be considerably higher.
Finally, it should be noted that the overall government win rate
contains instances in which defendants actually had a meritorious Massiah
substantive claim, but an appellate court concluded that the government
should prevail because: (1) the error was harmless;74 (2) the Massiah-infirm
67. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, No. 00 CR. 949(DAB), 2002 WL 313894 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
27, 2002); United States v. Romero, No. 97 CR. 650(LMM), 1998 WL 788799 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1998);
Brown v. State, 947 A.2d 1062, 1073 (Del. 2007); Watson v. United States, 940 A.2d 182, 188 (D.C.
2008).
68. See, e.g., People v. R.T.P., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
69. Cf GEORGE C. THOMAS & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO
MIRANDA AND BEYOND 195 (2012) (observing that selection bias in examining caselaw "should be in the
direction of finding more claims of Miranda violations than actually occur because most cases without
plausible arguments will not reach trial or, if they do, will not be appealed" (emphasis in original)).
70. See Table 2 - Government v. Defendant Wins, supra note 36.
71. See id.
72. See generally id; supra text accompanying note 69.
73. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133, 144 (2012) (observing that plea bargaining "is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system" (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted)).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1016 (4th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. Kilpatrick, 821
F.2d 1456, 1475 (10th Cir. 1987); Mealer v. Jones, 741 F.2d 1451, 1455 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
Guerra, 334 F.2d 138, 146 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964); Monroe v. Cain, No. 05-929, 2008 WL 818968, at *20-21,
*31 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 2008); United States v. Valencia-Vergara, No. 8:06-CR-279-T-17TBM, 2007 WL
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statement of the defendant could be used for impeachment purposes;15 or
(3) the court nullified what would otherwise have been a defendant win due
to the existence of an independent source76 or application of the inevitable
discovery doctrine." Of these, it is worth highlighting that harmless error
was by far the most common reason (56 of the 80 cases decided on a
non-merits basis, amounting to 70% of such cases)," evidencing perhaps not
so much the weakness of the Massiah doctrine, but rather the critical role of
harmless error review in constitutional criminal procedure litigation more
generally.7 9
Looking at the data as a whole, again with due regard for the fact that
the database does not reflect the many cases disposed of on the basis of
pleas8 and that the litigated cases logically reflect stronger cases for the
81drwsdefense, one can draw several conclusions. First, as the earlier discussion
regarding Table 4 reflects, courts are predisposed to condone government
use of undercover agents, concluding either (or both) that the individual
securing the confession was not a government agent and that the confession
did not result from deliberate elicitation.82  Second, that law enforcement,
177790, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2007); In re D.P., No. B194445, 2007 WL 4465512, at *22-23 (Cal. Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2007); People v. Viray, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693, 711-12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Finn,
42 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-08 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965); State v. LePage, 630 P.2d 674,683-85 (Idaho 1981);
State v. Kajoshaj, No. 76857, 2000 WL 1144929, at *9-12, *16--18, *20 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2000);
State v. Webb, 625 S.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980).
75. See, e.g., Trevino v. Alameida, No. C 04-0720 MMC (PR), 2007 WL 781590, at *41-43 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 2007); United States v. Langer, 41 M.J. 780, 783-84 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995); People v.
Trevino, No. H022406, 2002 WL 31304238, at *37-48 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2002); State v. Darwin,
290 A.2d 593, 599 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972); People v. Washington, 413 N.E.2d 170, 176 (111. App. Ct.
1980); State v. Conway, 842 N.E.2d 996, 1020 (Ohio 2006); State v. Mattatall, 603 A-2d 1098, 1111 (R.I.
1992); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1989). These outcomes, it should be noted, occurred
before the Court endorsed the impeachment exception in Kansas v. Ventris. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556
U.S. 586, 591 (2009).
76. See, eg, United States v. McManaman, No. CRO8-4025-MWB, 2008 WL 2397675, at *12-13
(N.D. Iowa June 9, 2008); United States v. Holland, 59 F. Supp. 2d 492, 519 n.29 (D. Md. 1998); State v.
Hackman, 943 P.2d 865, 869 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Wallace, Nos. D037057, D038339, 2002
WL 799713, at *13-14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 2002); Parker v. State, 533 N.E.2d 134, 135 (Ind. 1989).
77. The sole case in which the Supreme Court expressly allowed for the exception is Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984).
78. See Table 3 - Government Win Bases, supra note 37.
79. See generally Justin Murray, A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review, 130 HARV. L.
REv. 1791 (2017).
80. See supra text accompanying note 69 (discussing that the database does not include cases that
are resolved on the basis of plea bargains).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72 (explaining that weaker cases are less likely to be
litigated); see also Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargain Negotiations: Defining Competence Beyond Lafler and
Frye, 53 Am. CuM. L. REv. 377, 399 (2016) (discussing situations in which a defense attorney advises a
client not to plead guilty due to a strong defense).
82. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the data regarding incriminating statements
elicited by government and nongovemment agents).
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often by dint of assistance from prosecutors,8 3 is skillful at making strategic
use of the critical-stage-triggering event or offense-specific limits on
Massiah's application. Finally, the data here suggests that the Supreme
Court was mistaken in its empirical presumption in Montejo: that removing
the Jackson limit on securing waivers accounted for an insignificant number
of defense victories.8 4 Also, as noted earlier," it was also mistaken in its
presumption in Texas v. Cobb that further limiting the "offense-specific"
scope of Massiah,86 originated a decade earlier in McNeil v. Wisconsin,8
would not limit Massiah's protective reach; it has indeed done so.88
III. CONFESSIONS CONTEXTUALIZED
The Supreme Court has been in the business of regulating confessions
for a long time. Initially, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments served as the textual sources for the Court's work.9 0 In
decisions such as Brown v. Mississippi,91 in the "rubber hose" and "third
degree" era of policing,9 2 through more subtle police methods condemned in
Spano v. New York,93 the Court condemned involuntarily secured
confessions. Today, however, due process endures as a limit, but establishing
a claim is extremely difficult.94
83. See Table 4 - Reasons for Government Win, supra note 38 (showing that 41% of government
victories were due to a combination of critical stage or specific offense limits on Massiah). Whereas in
the Miranda context police often act alone, in the Massiah context, after charges are filed, very often
prosecutors play a more significant role in working with police. For a troubling instance of one such
cooperative effort, see Orange County Register, Inside the Snitch Tank: A Secret Jail-Informant Network,
YOUTUBE (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xi9XLnxRCHU (recounting a recent
practice in Orange County, California, in which police and prosecutors made long-term use of undercover
agents in cells in which discussions with accused parties were audio-taped).
84. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793-95 (2009); Table 4 - Reasons for Government
Win, supra note 38; see also, e.g., People v. Richardson, 528 N.E.2d 612,627 (111. 1988); State v. Dagnall,
612 N.W.2d 680, 696 (Wis. 2000); State v. Hormung, 600 N.W.2d 264, 267-69 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
85. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50 (noting the offense-specific requirement).
86. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168-71 (2001).
87. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).
88. See supra text accompanying note 43 (showing how Massiah's protective reach is limited by
these requirements).
89. See generally Thirty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Investigations and Police
Practices, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3 (2010).
90. Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 594
(2013).
91. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
92. THOMAS & LEO, supra note 69, at 128, 139-40 (discussing findings of the Wickersham
Commission in the early 1930s).
93. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S 315 (1959).
94. See generally Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2015); Paul Marcus, It's Not Just About Miranda: Determining
the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601 (2006).
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With Massiah, in 1964, the Court charted a different constitutional path
based on the Sixth Amendment, but two years later decided Miranda v.
Arizona,96 invoking the Fifth Amendment's right against compelled
self-incrimination. Since then, scholarly debate has raged over Miranda's
impact.97 Professor Paul Cassell in particular has repeatedly argued that
Miranda has significantly impaired police authority." Others, including
Professors John Donohue99 and Stephen Schulhofer,'oo have questioned
whether Miranda actually has had such a dire effect and expressed doubt over
whether it is possible to reliably assess its actual impact.101
Meanwhile, little work has examined the impact of Miranda in the
caselaw.102 In perhaps the only study of its kind, Professor George Thomas
analyzed a random sample of 211 Miranda-related cases from June 2002 in
the Westlaw database' and concluded that defendants prevailed in only 17%
of cases analyzedl04-a figure remarkably close to the 15% defendant-victory
rate uncovered in this study.'o According to Professor Thomas, by far the
greatest number of outcomes overall (51%) were based on the reviewing
95. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
96. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
97. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (1998) [hereinafter Cassel &
Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?]; Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment,
90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996) [hereinafter Cassel, Miranda's Social Costs]; Paul G. Cassell & Richard
Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review ofFifty Years ofEmpirical Evidence ofMiranda's Harmful
Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U. L. REv. 685 (2017) [hereinafter Cassel & Fowles, Still Handcuffing
the Cops?]; John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1147,
1170 (1998); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500 (1996).
98. See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?, supra note 97, at 1057-60, 1125-26;
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs, supra note 97, at 390-91, 423-24; Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing
the Cops?, supra note 97, at 725, 821.
99. Donohue, supra note 97, at 1170.
100. Schulhofer, supra note 97, at 502-03.
101. See id; Donohue, supra note 97, at 1170; see also Albert Alschuler, Miranda's Fourfold Failure,
97 B.U. L. REv. 849, 883-91 (2017) (providing extensive analysis of methodological and data-collection
challenges of assessing Miranda's real-world impact).
102. See generally George C. Thomas, Stories about Miranda, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1959 (2004).
103. Id at 1970.
104. Id. at 1966.
105. See Table 2 - Government v. Defendant Wins, supra note 36.
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court's conclusion that the defendant waived his Miranda rights.106 This
study, by contrast, found a significantly lower Massiah waiver rate (17%).107
In short, just as Miranda, in Professor Barry Friedman's words,
effectively has been overruled by "stealth,""os so too has Massiah, and just as
police interrogators have learned to live with Miranda,109 they have learned
to live with Massiah.no With Miranda, the most significant tool of police to
neutralize its protections is waiver,"' whereas with Massiah the data
examined here underscores widespread strategic police use of a few
formalistic requirements, such as securing information by means of what a
court concludes is a non-government agent, lack of deliberate elicitation, and
triggering prerequisites (critical stage and offense-specificity) to secure
admissible confessions.112 Going forward, if one were to examine caselaw
decided after late May 2009, when the Court in Montejo overruled Michigan
v. Jackson and allowed police to re-approach accused individuals,'13 it should
come as no surprise to see waiver rates in excess of that reported here (17%).
Of course, it remains to be seen how broadly courts will interpret Montejo,1 14
but early signs indicate that courts are siding with breadth."1
106. Thomas, supra note 102, at 1973 (citing Table 3. All Categories of Outcomes (246)). Professor
Thomas found, furthermore, that when police provided warnings to suspects, suspects waived Miranda in
68% of cases. Id. at 1972 (citing Table 2. Warnings given (186)); see also Paul G. Cassell & Bret S.
Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 839, 859 (1996) (reporting that over 80% of 173 suspects whom the police advised of their Miranda
rights waived them); Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation ofJuveniles: An Empirical Study ofPolicy and
Practice, 97 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 255-56 (2006) (finding that 80% of the 17-year-old
suspects whose interrogations were video recorded waived their Miranda rights); Richard A. Leo, Inside
the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CuM. L. & CRImINoLOGY 226,286 (1996) (finding that 78% of suspects in
182 confessions that were observed or recorded in California waived their Miranda rights).
107. See Table 4 - Reasons for Government Win, supra note 38.
108. Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v.
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 3-5 (2010). For discussion of how state and lower federal courts, left
un-superintended by the Supreme Court, limit "from below" the scope of the Court's caselaw, see Richard
M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016).
109. See Thomas, supra note 102, at 1979 (noting that "police and prosecutors manage quite nicely
to get what they want in a Miranda world"); see also Jacobi, supra note 14, at 16 ("Nowadays, the police
are used to Miranda and no longer consider it a major hurdle to their investigative
techniques .... Miranda is no longer objectionable to many in the law enforcement community because
of its minimalist and rote nature .... ).
110. See Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 381, 385 (2009) (surmising before Montejo that "[t]he practical consequence of [the
Court's] holding[] is that law enforcement easily can work around an existing attorney-client relationship
to question a charged defendant about nearly anything, up to and including the precise factual subject of
filed charges").
111. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing instances of suspect waiver); see also
Brensike-Primus, supra note 94, at 16-19.
112. See supra Introduction and Part I (discussing data collection and analysis methodology).
113. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (explaining the impact of Montejo).
114. See generally Edna Katherine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver: Montejo v. Louisiana and the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1335 (2011).
115. See Mastantuono & Coffee, supra note 21.
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To be sure, questions still exist regarding several important
Massiah-related issues already resolved in favor of the government vis-a-vis
Miranda, such as the permissible use of unlawfully secured physical
evidence "fruits"' 16 and investigative leads,"' and whether a "public safety"
exception exists.'8 Decisions from the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts
Courts, however, do not afford much reason to think that the doctrinal
evolution of Massiah will differ from that of Miranda."9 Finally, if the
Court's shift toward applying the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
only in instances of "sufficiently deliberate" police misconduct2 0 extends to
instances of police use of undercover agents-what has been fairly termed a
negligence standard-121 there will come further limits on the already modest
extent of defense victories.12 2 When this occurs, the once-glowing promise
116. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 630 (2004).
117. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
118. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984).
119. As has already occurred with respect to government use for impeachment purposes of statements
secured in violation of Massiah. See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 590-93 (2009). Earlier, the Court
held that a confession secured as a result of a government violation of the "prophylactic" rule of Michigan
v. Jackson could be used for impeachment. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351-52 (1990). Lower
courts, it should be noted, are inclined to conclude that when police violate Massiah and secure an initial
confession, they can, after obtaining a waiver, secure a second confession for use in trial, as Oregon v.
Elstad, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) permits in the Miranda context. See United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090
(8th Cir. 2005).
120. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144, 147 (2009).
[T]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the
justice system ....
... [W]hen police mistakes are the result of negligence ... rather than systemic error or reckless
disregard of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not "pay its way."
Id.
121. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 279 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (condemning
the majority for extending Massiah to "cover even a 'negligent' triggering of events resulting in reception
of disclosures"). It should be noted, however, that the Court has seemingly ruled out adoption of a "good
faith" exception in the Massiah context:
[T]o allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights whenever the police assert an alternative, legitimate reason for their
surveillance invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of fabricated
investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized in Massiah.
Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
122. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180 (granting relief based on government use of undercover agent to
deliberately elicit confession); Henry, 447 U.S. at 279 (same). Indeed, the stage has long been set for the
Court to more fully apply limits to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine in the Massiah context. See,
e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to a Sixth
Amendment violation, allowing admission of evidence of the location of victim's body and its condition).
Time will tell whether the Court will also apply two other major limits to the doctrine-the independent
source and attenuation limits. Already, lower courts have applied the independent source exception,
holding in favor of the government despite the existence of a Massiah violation. See, e.g., State v.
Hackman, 943 P.2d 865, 870 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
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of Massiah will be snuffed out alongside that of due processl23 and the
Miranda limits on police interrogation.124
IV. CONCLUSION
Analysis of forty-five years of caselaw suggests that, contrary to initial
dire concern that Massiah would stifle police efforts to secure confessions,
its actual impact has been limited. 125  Indeed, despite the Supreme Court's
assurance in Montejo v. Louisiana that Massiah endured in "substance,"'26 i
truth, when Montejo was decided in 2009, little remained of what was once
heralded as a constitutional bulwark against police overreach.'27 As much
was presaged in 1980 by Professor Yale Kamisar who noted that
"Massiah ... tum[ed] on nice distinctions that often will have no more
relationship to the suspect's plight than 'the kind of electronic equipment
employed' had to protection[s] against unreasonable search[es] and
seizur[es]."128
Whether the outcome is perhaps attributable to Massiah's purported
amorphous constitutional rationale,129 or simply reflects the broader ongoing
effort of conservative court majorities to limit Warren Court defense-oriented
holdings,'30 one cannot say for sure. There is no escaping, however, that
based on the results reported on in this Article, Massiah has failed to live up
to its promise as a protective shield for the criminally accused.
123. See Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah, supra note 15, at 54-55.
124. See Thomas, supra note 102, at 1979 (concluding, based on study of Miranda-related caselaw,
that "police and prosecutors manage quite nicely to get what they want in a Miranda world").
125. See Table 2 - Government v. Defendant Wins, supra note 36.
126. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009).
127. See generally supra Part II.
128. KAMISAR, supra note 15, at 223.
129. See, e.g, Tomkovicz, Adversary System, supra note 16, at 22-30 (noting the lack of an "in-depth
constitutional justification for the Massiah right"); Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra
note 18, at 762 ("The Court has failed to rationalize Massiah-based exclusion with clarity or consistency,
proffering deficient and potentially contradictory explanations."); Uviller, supra note 10, at 1164 (noting
that in a review of the Court's Massiah-related ecisions "[w]e are not much aided ... by the Court's own
explanation in the principal cases"); see also The Supreme Court, 1963 Term - Developments in the Law,
Right to Counsel Before Trial, 78 HARV. L. REv. 177, 217-221 (1964) ("The Court's opinion in Massiah
is so uninformative as to preclude a precise understanding of its rationale.").
130. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences,
Two Answers, 94 MINCH. L. REv. 2466 (1996).
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